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A B S T R A C T
Naval platform survivability is a key enabler to ensure maritime warfighting capability. Therefore, assessment of
naval platform recoverability, after a damage event, is critical to assure platform survivability in a warfighting
environment. To support such an assessment, an innovative modelling and simulation capability, known as the
Naval Damage Incident Recoverability Toolset (NavDIRecT) is being developed. NavDIRecT is being designed as a
component-based, open architecture providing the necessary framework to allow analysts to integrate domain
models of their choosing. NavDIRecT will facilitate analysis of warfighting and peacetime damage events using
a variety of mathematical models, thereby avoiding the limitations of other survivability assessment techniques.
Development of NavDIRecT is exemplified by integrating the human movement simulator, maritimeEXODUS, the
fire simulation environment, SMARTFIRE, and a three-dimensional naval platform model. NavDIRecT will enable
analysis of crew interaction with damage events, thereby allowing acquisition programs and mission planners
to examine platform survivability with respect to mission capability requirements. The impetus for NavDIRecT
development is for assessment of naval platform survivability and mission success; however, the tools and tech-
niques are equally suitable for use in incident management, training, and analysis of merchant and commercial
shipping in accordance with the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
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SOP Standard Operating Procedures
SQL Structured Query Language
V&V Verification and Validation
VR Virtual Reality
1. Introduction
The concept of survivability for a modern naval platform is a
whole-of-platform consideration. Referred to as ‘Integrated Survivabil-
ity’, it is the temporal accumulation of effects, and the consequences
of those effects, across the susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverabil-
ity domains (Brett et al., 2017). Platform systems and processes act-
ing as survivability control measures within each of those domains safe-
guard the platform, the crew and mission success from the threat en-
vironment. Ability to assess naval platform Integrated Survivability can
help to ensure that the platform survives, and recovers from, damage in-
cidents to enable successful completion of mission requirements. Other
benefits of Integrated Survivability assessment include: evaluating the
consequences of changes to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); eval-
uating the consequences of changes to platform configuration for the
fleet-in-being; the ability to perform capability trade-off analysis during
platform acquisition; evaluation of future survivability technologies; and
training utilising screen based, Virtual Reality (VR), and Augmented Re-
ality (AR) simulation. Consequently, there is a need to establish an ‘Inte-
grated Ship Survivability Assessment Capability’ (ISSAC) to assess the abil-
ity of naval platforms, and the onboard Damage Control (DC) organisa-
tion, to survive damage incidents in high threat environments.
Important considerations for naval platform survivability are the de-
cision-making process and the ability of the crew to manage, contain
and recover from the ongoing and evolving situation. This is known
as platform recoverability. Previously, recoverability had been consid-
ered an operational aspect of a naval platform and, therefore, not rele-
vant to survivability (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou, 2004, 2013);
and survivability was only defined in terms of susceptibility and vul-
nerability (Ball and Calvano, 1994; Boulougouris and Papaniko-
laou, 2004, 2013). However, the view that recoverability is not part of
platform survivability is not universally accepted and others consider it
an important factor when assessing platform survivability (Sajdak and
Karni, 2006; de Yong, 2008; Piperakis and Andrews, 2014; Li-
wang and Jonsson, 2015; Brett et al., 2017). Unfortunately, recov-
erability is difficult to quantify, with a need to understand: system func-
tionality and the relationship with platform capability and mission re-
quirements; the effects of fire and flood; and the effects of crew response
and damage control operations. Therefore, development of a recover-
ability modelling and analysis capability becomes a priority requirement
for the larger Integrated Survivability analysis capability. Subsequently,
the proposed first phase in the creation of the ISSAC framework is the
development of a Naval Damage Incident Recoverability Toolset (NavDI-
RecT).
The primary design goal for NavDIRecT is to integrate software tech-
nology that will provide a Modelling and Simulation (M&S) environ-
ment for the evaluation of naval platform recoverability, after the occur-
rence of a damage event. The primary analysis goal for NavDIRecT is to
analyse and quantify platform recoverability control measures with re-
spect to varying platform capability and configuration options, and var-
ious threat scenarios.
NavDIRecT is being developed as an open architecture (Sims, 2012)
environment to enable the use of different recoverability simulation
models. Importantly, no specific recoverability model or software toolset
will be hard-wired into the architecture. Designing NavDIRecT as an open
architecture will allow it to be shared with collaborative partners with-
out compromising intellectual property or security sensitivities of spe-
cific M&S tools. Each collaborative partner may integrate models of their
choosing to enable comparative studies or to facilitate the provision of
specific modelling and analysis capabilities.
Initially, NavDIRecT is designed to model fire events and the crew re-
sponse to such events, which, in some instances, might be initiated by
a blast model to simulate explosive detonation. As the toolset evolves,
NavDIRecT will also in
corporate models for system damage, flooding and toxic hazard events.
It will also include the capability to model crew combating damage and
recovering system functionality to restore mission capability. Eventu-
ally, the NavDIRecT architecture will evolve into the ISSAC framework
incorporating the temporal accumulation of effects across the three sur-
vivability domains of susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability.
2. Naval Integrated Survivability
The Integrated Survivability ‘onion’, Fig. 1, presents layers of de-
fence afforded to naval platforms to counter a high threat environment.
When defences are breached, platform survivability is likely to become
degraded and the platform more susceptible to ongoing threats. Each
layer of defence has a specific survivability role:
1. susceptibility – to reduce the likelihood of being detected, engaged
and hit by external threats;
2. vulnerability – to resist damage; and
3. recoverability – DC, and recovery of platform capability to ensure
crew and platform safety, and mission success.
Unfortunately, there is no capability to provide whole-of-platform
Integrated Survivability temporal analysis. However, software models
to analyse individual aspects of susceptibility, vulnerability and re-
coverability exist (Buckland, 2008; Kok, 2012); and commer-
cial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software integrating elements of the Integrated
Survivability domains are available (Schofield, 2009; T&E, 2019;
SURMA, 2019). For example, the Integrated Recoverability Model (IRM)
(T&E, 2019) considers platform system modelling, fire modelling and
crew movement for recovery of system functionality; SURMA (SURMA,
2019) considers signature management, vulnerability and fire effects;
and SURVIVE (Schofield, 2009), was originally designed for vulnera-
bility modelling with ability to incorporate elements of susceptibility,
and a consideration for incorporating crew movement (Turner et al.,
2006). Furthermore, with the aforementioned COTS software, issues
arise relating to the proprietary nature of the underlying algorithms;
national security; a lack of flexibility to plug-and-play domain specific
models; and/or licensing costs. Other models, utilising, for example,
Subject Matter Expert (SME) opinion (Gamble et al., 2014), genetic
algorithms (Boulougouris and Papanikolaou, 2004) and probability
analysis (Liwang and Jonsson, 2015), also have drawbacks and/or
limitations. In many instances, the models consider survivability as a
static concept. That is, they provide a single measure of survivability.
This raises the question ‘what is survivability?’ (Brett et al., 2017). Is
it, for example, the mission, crew safety, an ability to perform a specific
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function, or the ability to return to port? Furthermore, there is a need to
assess the ongoing detrimental loss and/or incremental recovery of sur-
vivability, which, in turn, affects the ability of the platform to perform
specific functions.
There is acceptance that the crew can perform operations to (hope-
fully) control the spread of damage and recover platform capability, but
there is a lack of analysis regarding how this affects overall platform sur-
vivability. As such, the available models do not account for the intercon-
nected nature of Integrated Survivability, nor do they consider temporal
effects of ongoing/evolving damage or of recoverability operations. That
is not to say the aforementioned models are invalid for their individual
problem space; they are just not designed to account for the interactive
nature of Integrated Survivability. Consequently, there is a need for a
whole-of-scenario, whole-of-ship framework for Integrated Survivability
analysis (Brett et al., 2017). Construction of this framework has com-
menced with the development of an integrated architecture to model the
recoverability domain of Integrated Survivability, referred to as NavDI-
RecT.
3. Naval recoverability
Naval platform recoverability forms the innermost rings of the Inte-
grated Survivability ‘onion’, Fig. 1, whereby the crew and safety sys-
tems of the platform need to control the spread of damage and restore
platform capability. Software tools that provide aspects of recoverabil-
ity analysis do exist. For example, IRM (T&E, 2019) combines human
movement, fire modelling (using the Fire and Smoke Simulator (FSSIM)
(Floyd et al., 2005)), flood modelling, and systems modelling to exam-
ine the effects of damage and the ability to restore system functionality.
Other tools that may be used to provide elements of recoverability mod-
elling include: maritimeEXODUS (mEX) (Galea et al., 2013, 2016a)
and Evacuation Index (EVI) (Azzi et al., 2011) to model pedestrian dy-
namics on board maritime platforms, primarily for evacuation analy-
sis; SMARTFIRE (SMF) (Ewer et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013), FS-
SIM (Floyd et al., 2005), and Fire Dynamics Simulator (McGrattan et
al., 2016) to model fire and smoke progression through structures; and
FREDYN (Ypma and Turner, 2019) for flood and stability modelling
analysis. Tools such as the EXODUS suite (FSEG, 2019) of pedestrian
and evacuation simulation software (including mEX), and the SMF fire
simulation software can also be coupled to explore the interaction of
pedestrians with the developing fire environment to predict human sur-
vivability when exposed to fire incidents (Galea et al., 2016b, 2017).
However, these tools are unable to provide whole-of-platform recover-
ability, or survivability, analysis.
At the onset of a naval platform damage event, one or more DC
Centres (DCC) will be formed. Crew assigned to the DCC monitor the
evolving situation, and control the allocation of resources and DC teams,
in accordance with the aims and priorities of the platform's command
team. DC team actions include identifying damage locations, locating
and retrieving incapacitated crew, fighting fires, controlling damage,
restoring system functionality, and decision-making to co-ordinate the
DC response. Consequently, for a recoverability modelling capability to
model the variety of damage events a platform and its crew are likely
to encounter, a multi-disciplinary solution is required. This necessitates
understanding, and analysis, of the scope and implications of all of the
modelling requirements.
4. Modelling requirements
To elicit the M&S requirements for an Integrated Survivability analy-
sis capability, a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) (Robinson
et al.,
2010) approach was implemented. This phase also included a review
of Board of Inquiry reports (Ministry of Defence, 1982; Common-
wealth of Australia, 1998; Drennan, 2008; Peniston, 2013), which
provided understanding of actions that commonly occur during recov-
erability from naval damage incidents. In particular, a timeline for the
fire incident on Her Majesty's Australian Ship (HMAS) Westralia in 1998
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1998) was created, Fig. 2, to enable
identification of events and consequent actions that might occur during
naval recoverability operations. Table 1 documents events noted in the
Fig. 2 timeline.
To simulate the events that occurred aboard HMAS Westralia in
1998, as summarised in Table 1, would require M&S capabilities to
model:
- command hierarchy decision-making and management of DC opera-
tions;
- DC SOPs and crew movement; and
- the propagation of fire and smoke, cognisant of crew actions.
However, this is a simplistic, informal view, albeit one that gives
insight into naval recoverability. Subsequently, formal requirements
analysis commenced with a Work Domain Analysis (Liu and Woolley,
2015; Woolley and Gould, 2015), resulting in the identification of
four categories of recoverability measures:
M1: Mission Effectiveness;
M2: Ship Survivability;
M3: Crew Safety; and
M4: Command Decision-making.
A sample of identified recoverability measures and associated met-
rics for each of the four categories is presented in Table 2. The major-
ity of the metrics are static and provide insight regarding the success,
or failure, of the recoverability process being analysed. However, metric
M1.2 is proposed as a temporal metric measuring the progress of capa-
bility recovery. Where capability would be a measure of platform surviv-
ability or system functionality to perform a mission related task, depend-
ing on the analysis requirement. Analysis of the factors contributing to
the metric will enable identification of changes to systems or processes
that might improve the recoverability process, which could be imple-
mented on the platform as configuration changes (such as, inclusion of
fire insulation, moving the fixed location of fire mains) or as changes
to recoverability and DC SOPs. Metric M1.2 will require definition of
the survivability scenario and understanding of platform capability re-
quirements with respect to the scenario, as discussed in Section 2 and
in (Brett et al., 2017). Once the capability-survivability relationship is
defined, and utilising the Fault Tree information from Metric 2.1, Met-
ric M1.2 can be displayed temporally to show progress towards platform
recoverability and survivability.
Analysis of the measures and metrics enabled identification of NavDI-
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Table 1
Events during fire on HMAS Westralia.
Key Time Event
A 10:34 DCC formed when a substantial fuel leak was reported.
B 10:35 Fire reported in Main Machinery Space (MMS) on Starboard Main
Engine.
C 10:36 1. MMS evacuation alarm activated.
2. Bridge alarm activated; ship goes to emergency stations.
3. Forward and aft DC Section Bases (DCSBs) formed.
D 10:38 1. Personnel evacuated from Machinery Control Room.
2. Isolation of affected systems.
E 10:39 SHIP BECOMES DISABLED
Command Priorities: (1) contain fire; and (2) identify casualties.
F 10:49 1. DCC directs aft DCSB to establish MMS smoke boundaries and
boundary cooling.
2. DCC directs Hose Team (HT) 3 be formed in forward DCSB.
3. Two containment teams from aft DCSB to perform boundary
cooling. Standing Sea Fire Brigade to monitor bulkhead
temperatures.
G 10:50 Open Circuit Compressed Air Breathing Apparatus (OCCABA)
control board set up for HT 1. HT 1 enters MMS.
H 10:51 HT 1 identifies hot spots using Thermal Imaging Camera and
decides firefighting technique to apply.
I 10:52 HT 1 begins firefighting.
J 11:00 HT 1 ordered to exit MMS in preparation for Carbon Dioxide
(CO2) drench.
K 11:01 CO2 drench remotely activated.
L 11:08 Second CO2 drench occurs.
M 11:26 1. DCC approves HT 2 to enter MMS.
2. HT 2 identifies hot spots and decides firefighting technique to
apply.
N 11:27 HT 2 commences firefighting.
O 11:47 HT 2 exits MMS due to low air in OCCABA.
P 11:51 HT 3 directed to enter MMS.
Q 11:53 1. HT 3 identifies hot spots and decides firefighting technique to
apply.
2. Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) dumped through ship
funnel into MMS.
R 11:54 HT 3 continues firefighting.
S 12:10 HT 1 enters MMS.
T 12:15 HT 3 exits MMS.
Y 12:21 HT 1 continues firefighting, targeting hot spots.
V 12:30 HT 2 re-enters MMS.
W 12:32 1. HT 1 advises HT 2 fire is extinguished.
2. DCC advised fire extinguished.
X 12:33 HTs rotated until smoke declared clear.
- DC techniques:
o firefighting;
o flood control; and
o toxic hazard response;
- safety systems; and
- system functionality mapped to platform capability and mission re-
quirements.
The M&S functional requirements are complemented by NavDIRecT
system requirements, as discussed in the following sections, and include:
- the ability to utilise software tools and models akin to a
‘plug-and-play’ capability, which are often of different fidelity (Sec-
tion 4.1);
- re-use of legacy software tools (Section 4.2);
- temporal management (Section 4.3);
- simulation speed (Section 4.4);
- repeatable simulations (Section 4.5);
- simulation replay (Section 4.6); and
- visualisation of simulations, and analysis of the outputs (Section 4.7).
Table 2
Sample of recoverability measures and metrics.
Measure Description Metric
M1: Mission Effectiveness
M1.1 Can the platform achieve Command Aims
(CAs)?
YES/NO




M1.3 Time to recover platform capability in
accordance with CAs and Priorities.
Time (hh:mm:ss)
M2: Ship Survivability




M2.2 Can the platform float? YES/NO
M2.3 Can the platform move? YES/NO
M2.4 Time to contain fire. Time (hh:mm:ss)
M2.5 Time to contain flooding. Time (hh:mm:ss)




M3.1 Crew casualties immediately after damage
event.
Integer
M3.2 Crew incapacitation due to the ongoing
situation.
Integer
M3.3 Time to evacuate crew from incident
scene.
Time (hh:mm:ss)
M3.4 Time to evacuate platform (if ordered). Time (hh:mm:ss)
4.1. Plug-and-play capability
The NavDIRecT functional and system requirements are not currently
afforded by any COTS recoverability modelling software (as discussed
in Section 2); rather, the requirements will be achieved by the intercon-
nection of various software models that provide elements of the recover-
ability modelling capability, connected in a temporal M&S environment.
Consequently, the NavDIRecT architecture must be capable of utilising
legacy, bespoke and COTS M&S software as required. The architecture
must also be capable of utilising software capable of supporting the spe-
cific analysis requirements that have been identified for the system. For
example, utilising software models of different fidelity. To enable the
plug-and-play capability, interfaces specific to each software tool must
be created to enable it to connect to the NavDIRecT architecture.
4.1.1. Model fidelity
The NavDIRecT environment will integrate various legacy, bespoke
and COTS M&S software, each of differing levels of fidelity. Fidelity, as
defined by Burnett (Burnett, 2008, p.2), is the ‘level of faithfulness of
the reproduction, in accuracy and resolution, for both, form and func-
tion as measured in comparison to the entity or environment being sim-
ulated’. The United States Department of Defense defines fidelity as ‘the
degree to which a model or simulation represents the state and behav-
iour of a real world object or the perception of a real world object,
feature, condition, or chosen standard in a measurable or perceivable
manner; a measure of the realism of a model or simulation’ (Depart-
ment of Defense, 2016). The differing levels of fidelity between the
software tools will pose a challenge during analysis and will constrain
the accuracy of measurement in predicting outcomes. Use of low fidelity
software tools may also result in a failure to predict crucial phenom-
ena or behaviour. For example, when modelling fire, a zone model will
not differentiate localised heating of a specific element within a com-
plex three-dimensional space. Conversely, fire modelling using Compu-
tational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) has that capability. With respect to mod-
elling human behaviour, using a course-node evacuation model for the
crew of a naval platform, or a merchant ship, will not have the ability to
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There is also the issue of data fidelity – the accuracy and resolution
of the available data. During the phases of a naval platform's life cy-
cle, from design through to disposal, the quality and quantity of avail-
able data, utilised to describe the platform and its systems, will vary.
During early design phases, there is likely to be a low quantity of data
available regarding layout, construction materials, system configuration,
crew complement, and recoverability procedures. That is, the data is of
‘low’ fidelity. During later design phases, and during operational ser-
vice, the quantity of the available data becomes much higher and, gen-
erally, is of better quality (having greater accuracy and relevancy). That
is, the data is of ‘high’ (or higher) fidelity. In order to facilitate analysis
using both low and high fidelity data requires the use of suitable soft-
ware tools and models with the ability to support analysis of the avail-
able data.
There may also be a need to perform a rapid assessment of a de-
sign or technology to test its suitability for use in platform survivabil-
ity. This may only require an approximation of the real-world system,
needing less complex and less exact models. Alternatively, there may be
need for a more detailed analysis to understand, for example, structural
loading and/or stability in flooding conditions. This may require models
of greater complexity, requiring higher resolution data, to more faith-
fully represent the real-world system. The plug-and-play requirement for
NavDIRecT to facilitate software tools, models and data of different fi-
delity enables the analyst to use those tools that are best suited to spe-
cific analysis requirements.
4.2. Legacy software
NavDIRecT will include the use of bespoke legacy software tools that
were designed to solve domain specific problems. The plug-and-play ca-
pability means that NavDIRecT will provide a framework to enable the
repurposing of legacy software tools to facilitate recoverability analy-
sis. Noting, it is not the goal of NavDIRecT development to create new
software tools for individual elements of recoverability modelling and
analysis. That remains the purview of the specialists utilising the legacy
software. NavDIRecT will be a framework for whole-of-ship analysis us-
ing those tools.
4.3. Temporal management
The issue of temporal management is of concern due to repurpos-
ing the use of the legacy and COTS software. Legacy and COTS soft-
ware, if they are continuous simulations (Birta and Arbez, 2007), will
have specific methods of internal time management that do not neces-
sarily match that of any other software being used. Alternatively, some
software models may be discrete event simulations (Birta and Arbez,
2007), to model the sequence of events that occur during a scenario.
Furthermore, each software model may have different initiation times,
according to when they are required during the simulation. Finally,
modelling may be required prior to commencing a simulation to iden-
tify the initial state of, and starting conditions for, the environment be-
ing modelled. Therefore, the different time steps, event times and initial
modelling state will need to be unified. NavDIRecT will provide the un-
derlying architecture to facilitate temporal connectivity between avail-
able legacy and COTS software, while also allowing for the inclusion of
future COTS and bespoke M&S software tools that may have a different
understanding of time.
The temporal connectivity capability of the NavDIRecT architecture
will keep the software synchronised while performing whole-of-ship re-
coverability M&S. This will require the definition of a communication
protocol to enable information passing and time synchronisation be-
tween each of the M&S software tools.
4.4. Simulation speed
Speed of computation and, therefore, simulation speed is a con-
sideration dependent on the usage applications for NavDIRecT. In the
case of analysis and assessment for acquisition programs and in-ser-
vice platform upgrades the importance of simulation speed is not a
key driver so long as it does not impede
delivery of the acquisition or upgrades. In the case of using NavDIRecT
in a training environment, real time simulation will be a requirement to
allow trainees to realistically interact with the environment. Finally, if
NavDIRecT were to be deployed onboard naval (and merchant shipping)
as an aid in the recoverability and DC process, faster than real time sim-
ulation will be required to scope out multiple optional resolutions and
mitigations strategies.
The current modelling technology is suitable for the use in recover-
ability analysis for platform acquisition and in-service upgrade where
real-time and faster than real-time simulation is not required. Real-time
simulation is achievable at the cost of modelling fidelity (especially in
the fire modelling domain), which can be an adequate compromise for
training purposes. However, for a deployed recoverability support tool,
requiring faster than real-time simulation, the current technology is un-
able to provide a viable solution.
4.5. Repeatable simulations
As with any experiment, recoverability simulations need to be re-
peatable to test the conditions of the simulation scenario, and establish
standard deviations for the results.
4.6. Simulation replay
The requirement for simulation replay allows any simulation to be
reviewed and analysed to understand the interaction of critical and
non-critical events and the resultant evolution of the simulation.
4.7. Visualisation of simulations
The ability to visualise simulations using a variety of different modes
(for example, DC and search teams) will enhance communication of re-
sults to stakeholders, and will also facilitate understanding of the results.
Longer-term development will facilitate immersive simulation, with a
human-in-the-loop for analysing scenarios, and for training DC practi-
tioners.
5. NavDIRecT framework
Ongoing analysis of the M&S requirements has identified a possible
NavDIRecT framework solution. The proposed architecture, Fig. 3, con-
sists of four key components: (1) Simulation Engine; (2) Physical Phe-
nomena Models; (3) Damage Command & Control (C&C) Module; and
(4) Databases. Arrows in Fig. 3 show connectivity between the compo-
nents. Due to its complexity, NavDIRecT is being developed over a num-
ber of phases. The current phase of development has communication
occurring between ‘Fire & Smoke Simulation’ and ‘Crew Movement’ to
simulate crew interaction with the fire. Fire simulation occurs during
runtime to afford realistic modelling of crew interaction with the fire,
and the ability to model the effects of changes to DC SOPs, and DC safety
systems.
5.1. Simulation Engine
The Simulation Engine will provide the ‘back-bone’ for NavDIRecT.
Primarily, it will be required to manage the complexities of tempo-
rally aligning simulation models during runtime, and communicate in-
formation and instructions between the simulation models. To provide
the required runtime functionality, implementing NavDIRecT utilising
High Level Architecture (HLA) (Reid, 2000; Cramp, 2009) was ini-
tially considered. The advantages of HLA are the provision of in-built
temporal management, and its flexibility with data management. Un-
fortunately, HLA is a complex simulation environment, requiring sig-
nificant upfront resource expenditure to build, and maintain, a suit-
able simulation environment. HLA is best suited for large scale, mul-
tiparty, low-medium data environments for long-term M&S solutions
(Reid, 2000). Unfortunately, the (financial and personnel) resourc-
ing constraints imposed on the development of NavDIRecT meant that
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Fig. 3. NavDIRecT framework.
ternative to using HLA is a bespoke solution, utilising a ‘game engine’.
This has advantages in producing an easy to build M&S architecture in
line with the NavDIRecT requirement of integrating individual simula-
tion tools within a common framework. The game engine provides capa-
bilities for use in temporal and data management, thereby achieving the
same functionality that would be provided by HLA. The main considera-
tion regarding the use of a game engine is that, if not managed properly,
this form of bespoke solution may result in a ‘piecemeal’ framework un-
able to provide suitable compatibility between simulation models.
The development of game engines has progressed due to signifi-
cant investment within the computer game industry to create computer
games that more readily take advantage of advances in computer hard-
ware design and offer more realistic and immersive supporting models
(Söbke and Streicher, 2016). The basic architecture of a game engine
often has core functionality consisting of a physics module (for effects
and movement), an artificial intelligence capability (for in-game char-
acters not controlled by human players), and a rendering engine (for
graphics) within a temporally connected environment (Söbke and Stre-
icher, 2016; Vasudevamurt and Uskov, 2015). Also, the use of HLA
is not precluded from this solution. As with other simulation tools that
would be integrated into the NavDIRecT framework, HLA simulations
may be adapted to suit (Söderbäck, 2017). Furthermore, if required
and if resources became available, the bespoke game engine solution
might be adapted to HLA.
The architecture provided by game engines, therefore, ideally suits
the current NavDIRecT M&S system requirements, without the overhead
required for the implementation of HLA. In particular, with a grow-
ing third-party middle-ware library of software tools, Unity (Vasude-
vamurt and Uskov, 2015; Unity, 2019) was selected as providing a
sufficiently comprehensive and cost-effective solution for the implemen-
tation of the Simulation Engine framework, Fig. 3, required by NavDI-
RecT.
5.2. Physical phenomena models
The Physical Phenomena Models are those that simulate the phys-
ical behaviours of the required scenarios, emulating the real world
environment. For
the current phase of NavDIRecT development, specific off-the-shelf and
bespoke software are being utilised to model blast and fragmentation,
fire, and crew movement and response. Future development will include
examining the inclusion of other phenomena, such as flooding, toxic
hazard, system repair and damage mitigation. The physical phenomena
models to be included during the current phase of development are:
1. CVAM (Buckland, 2008) to model explosive blast and fragmenta-
tion events that will initiate recoverability scenarios within NavDI-
RecT. CVAM provides a capability to model platform structures and
systems against a variety of above water, internal and external det-
onation effects. System damage and the resultant effects on platform
capability are currently represented by Fault Trees. The CVAM model
was partially validated by the Ship Survivability Enhancement Pro-
gram (SSEP) utilising ex-HMAS Derwent (the SSEP experimental de-
sign is documented in (Howe, 1996); validation analysis is not avail-
able in the public domain);
2. maritimeEXODUS (mEX) (Galea et al., 2013, 2016a) to model crew
movement. The mEX evacuation model has an extensive validation
history and ability to couple with CFD fire simulation (Galea et
al 2004, 2013). It is used to perform the human factors simula-
tions in NavDIRecT. mEX is designed for applications in the mar-
itime industry, including ship design, compliance with International
Maritime Organization (IMO) certification and naval ship code re-
quirements, crew training, development of crew procedures, reso-
lution of operational issues and accident investigation. The mEX
software takes into consideration various interactions: people-peo-
ple; people-fire; and people-structure. It comprises five core interact-
ing models: PASSENGER, MOVEMENT, BEHAVIOUR, TOXICITY and
HAZARD. The PASSENGER model describes an individual as a col-
lection of defining attributes and variables such as name, gender,
age, maximum unhindered fast walking speed, maximum unhindered
walking speed, response time and agility. The HAZARD model con-
trols the atmospheric and physical environment by importing the pre-
dicted fire hazard data, like those generated by the SMF CFD fire
model. The TOXICITY model determines the physiological effects on
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tributed by the HAZARD model. The mEX software has a number of
unique features, such as the capability to represent the performance
of both naval personnel and civilians in the operation of watertight
doors, vertical ladders, hatches and 60° stairs. Another feature of the
software is the ability to assign crew and passengers a list of itiner-
ary tasks to perform. The itinerary tasks can represent a vast breadth
of real world tasks from donning appropriate apparel to performing
compartment searches. Many itinerary tasks were developed as part
of the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council funded
project, named EGO (Deere et al., 2008), which introduced several
naval specific tasks into the software, such as ‘blanket search’ and the
‘repeat’ command to represent a crew member on patrol; and
3. SMF (Ewer et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013) to model fire and
smoke. SMF is an advanced suite of inter-coupled tools allowing users
to rapidly and reliably create, simulate, interrogate and analyse fire
simulation problems. Highly intuitive and interactive components al-
low both expert and novice users to build/specify a fire simulation
geometry, define a scenario, specify a suitable CFD mesh, simulate
the effects of the fire and to visualise the results. The specification
tools allow considerable flexibility to configure arbitrarily complex
fire scenarios in the built environment. The SMF numerical engine is
highly interactive, providing run-time visuals, numerical results and
graphs. The software can simulate hot, turbulent, buoyant flows with
convective, conductive and radiative heat transfer. Fires can be rep-
resented as volumetric heat sources, mass sources of a gaseous fuel
(using an eddy dissipation combustion model) or as burnable surfaces
that can ignite and spread flaming combustion. Parallel workstation,
multi-core and Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) acceleration are be-
ing developed and hazard coupling to evacuation modelling is fully
supported (Sauter, 2015).
Ongoing development of crew behaviour models, using cognitive
analysis (Liu and Woolley, 2015; Woolley and Liu, 2016), will be
implemented within mEX to control artificial agents representing crew
performing recoverability operations. Using cognitive analysis tech-
niques will enable realistic representation of crew behaviour when per-
forming activities, such as blanket search and firefighting. Furthermore,
DC procedures can be platform specific, and there will be variation be-
tween platform classes and with merchant shipping. Therefore, cogni-
tive analysis provides a method to identify behaviour relevant to the
domain of interest. The advantage with implementing realistic crew be-
haviour models is the ability to analyse changes to SOPs and changes to
platform configuration.
5.3. Damage Command & Control Module
This bespoke module, yet to be implemented, represents deci-
sion-making within DCC and the naval platform's chain-of-command.
To construct this module, knowledge elicitation cognitive analysis tech-
niques will be utilised during interviews with experienced naval DC per-
sonnel (Liu and Woolley, 2015). The knowledge gained will form the
basis of cognitive reasoning models for DC decision-making.
5.4. Data storage – common database layer
Several databases will service the NavDIRecT framework, to enable
the recording of runtime data for future analysis and simulation replay,
and to act as a repository for data required during runtime (such as, plat-
form configuration). One proposed method of database implementation
is to use a NoSQL distributed architecture (Burd, 2011). NoSQL allows
for high availability, scalability and robustness of the backend systems
and, as a result, they power many commercial enterprises that require a
large online presence (for example, DynamoDB at Amazon Web Services
(Amazon, 2019), and Cassandra used by eBay and Netflix (Cassandra,
2016).
Traditional Structured Query Language (SQL) underperforms when
servicing hundreds of thousands of individual data requests. Conversely,
NoSQL systems satisfy these demands (at the potential cost of com-
promising database
consistency; that is, compromising the rules governing database trans-
actions) by allowing multiple computer servers to share the load across
one seamless system. The advantage with this approach for a small-scale
M&S capability, like NavDIRecT, is that data can be quickly, robustly and
reliably accessed, with the benefit of ease of scalability as the system
evolves. For individual cases, where three or four simulation tools are
connected for a simulation run, there is no significant benefit over tradi-
tional SQL systems but, when stochastic runs are considered, the value
of a distributed NoSQL system becomes apparent. Many simulations can
be run in parallel, and in batches, to reliably traverse a large solution
space for the analysis of a number of M&S options and scenarios.
6. System usage
It is envisaged that NavDIRecT will have six modes of operation, with
data being saved at intervals during simulation runs, as shown in Fig.
4.
6.1. Set-up mode
In this mode, the user constructs scenarios to be modelled. The user
can, for example, define the initial location of the crew agents, and tasks
they are to perform. The state of the platform may also be specified,
for example angle of heel and trim, and initial state information such
as whether watertight doors and hatches are open or closed. The user
may also define the initiation of the fire scenario, whether it commences
from a blast event, or as a result of ignition from other sources. Further,
previously saved scenarios and simulations may be reloaded for simula-
tion replay or modification.
6.2. Simulation mode
his mode makes use of the integrated fire and crew movement mod-
elling to simulate teams performing fire DC operations. Some recover-
ability scenarios may not involve fire and may only involve crew move-
ment and tasks. In the early phases of NavDIRecT development, no user
interaction will occur during simulation.
6.3. Interactive Mode
When implemented, this mode will enable users to control the move-
ment and behaviour of crew agents in real-time during a simulation.
All interactions will be logged and analysed to enable, for example, the
validation of new SOPs and command decisions. Interactive Mode is an
additional mode of operation to be implemented during later phases of
NavDIRecT development.
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6.4. Replay mode
This mode provides functionality to replay previously modelled sim-
ulations. At any point during replay, the user may stop the simulation
and identify changes to be implemented in follow-up scenarios. Changes
to the scenario are implemented in the Modification Mode, which in-
volves returning to the closest Save Point, implementing the required
changes in Setup Mode, and re-starting the simulation from the Save
Point.
6.5. Analysis Mode
Analysis Mode will allow the user access to the numerical and/or be-
havioural data produced by the simulations. Upon examination of the
data, the user may decide to further modify a scenario. Changes to the
scenario will be implemented in the Modification Mode.
6.6. Modification Mode
During Replay and Analysis Modes, the user may wish to modify the
scenario at a key point in the simulation and continue the simulation
from that point with modified conditions or actions. This is achieved in
the Modification Mode, which allows the user to access the closest Save
Point, implement changes to the model via the Setup Mode and restart
the simulation in the Simulation Mode.
6.7. Save Points
During a simulation, simulation data will be continuously saved for
analysis purposes, or for simulation replay. This will also enable users to
re-start a simulation at any point within the simulation without the need
to re-commence from the beginning.
7. Simulating crew behaviour
Crew behaviour and DCC decision-making is modelled within ‘Crew
Damage Control Behaviour Models’ and the ‘Damage Command & Con-
trol Module’ as depicted in Fig. 3. Behaviour responses relating to local
conditions affecting crew agents will be implemented within the ‘Crew
Movement’ model. High-level decision-making, such as prioritising re-
coverability operations, will be implemented within the ‘Damage C&C
Module’. To assist with decision-making, and situation awareness within
the simulation, three views of the simulated environment are defined:
World View; Agent View; and DCC View. The ‘Crew Movement’ model
will be aware of the crew agents' Physical State and the Action State
being performed, with each state contributing to the three simulation
views. Two other states necessary to perform recoverability related de-
cision-making are also defined: External Decision State; and Internal De-
cision State.
7.1. World View
The World View represents the totality of the situation occurring
within the simulation, untainted by crew agent perceptions of what
might be occurring. The World View gives the user access to all simula-
tion information defining the current state of the environment and the
crew. This will include information that cannot be perceived by agents
within the simulation.
7.2. Agent View
This represents the information available to individual crew agents.
The Agent View is an abstraction of the World View based on what
crew agents would realistically sense in their vicinity, equivalent to
the perceptions of real platform crew. Since this view is based on
agent perceptions, information collected by the agent may be incom-
plete, inaccurate and/or out-of-date. The
Agent View is to be implemented within ‘Crew Damage Control Behav-
iour Models’ (see Fig. 3).
7.3. DCC view
This represents the amalgamated information as received from crew
agents for the simulated DCC to develop a situational awareness of the
ongoing and evolving scenario. Since the DCC View is an amalgamation
of information from a variety of sources, including the Agent View, the
situational awareness developed by the DCC View may be incomplete,
inaccurate and/or out-of-date. This situational awareness information
will be utilised by the ‘Damage Command & Control Module’ to define
DC aims and priorities, and for resultant decision-making (see External
Decision State).
7.4. Action State
An Action State simulates the activity crew agents are to perform.
An Action State will include information concerning time taken for the
agent to perform the activity, which is passed to Physical State to cal-
culate factors such as crew fatigue, or remaining air in the Open Cir-
cuit Compressed Air Breathing Apparatus (OCCABA). Action State also
contains information concerning the crew agent's observations of the en-
vironment. For example, a crew agent might observe ‘water tight door
closed’. This observation will be communicated to Internal Decision
State to decide whether or not to open the door.
7.5. Physical State
This represents the physiological state of the agent (for example,
level of fatigue), their physical skills, location, and equipment they
might be carrying. The Physical State of crew agents will be affected
by activities they are performing (as directed by the Action State).
Longer-term consideration will need to be given to crew agents working
in teams, and understanding how the combined skill of the team affects
recoverability operations. Initially, though, Physical State will be limited
to the current capabilities of mEX (‘Crew Movement’ modelling capa-
bility) for agents to react to fire hazards. Longer-term development will
include physiological state, physical skills, and the effects of equipment
being carried.
7.6. External Decision State
External Decision State identifies recoverability priorities based on
current situation awareness, and performs decision-making in response
to those priorities. Consequently, DCC View provides input (based on
simulated crew perceptions) to the External Decision State. Rules to
perform decision-making will be identified using knowledge elicitation
techniques (Liu and Woolley, 2015).
For example, during the fire on HMAS Westralia in 1998, the com-
manding officer was monitoring the state of the fire and, at 1100 (Point
K in Fig. 1 and Table 1) decided it was necessary to control the fire
with a CO2 drench. This was a critical decision, since a CO2 drench cre-
ates an unsafe environment for the crew and, at the time, the location
of four crew members was unknown, possibly last seen in the Main Ma-
chinery Space (MMS). The commanding officer had to make the decision
whether to risk the lives of four unaccounted for crew or risk the lives
of the remaining crew and the safety of the platform. Another consid-
eration for performing this action is that the CO2 drench precluded the
crew from entering the MMS until 20 min had elapsed. After 20 min, the
MMS was then deemed safe to re-enter so crew could perform a search
for incapacitated personnel or perform manual firefighting operations.
Priority based decision-making will occur on an ongoing basis during an
incident and, as the situation evolves, so will the priorities and the avail-
able information.
7.7. Internal Decision state
This represents the cognitive ability of crew agents and will re-
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decision-making for crew agents in relation to interaction with the local
environment. Upon deciding actions for crew agents to perform, Inter-
nal Decision State communicates the action to the Action State. Knowl-
edge elicitation techniques will be used to define crew behaviours, and
to identify decisions required to enact that behaviour (Liu and Wool-
ley, 2015; Woolley and Liu, 2016). The Internal Decision State is
governed by priorities set by the External Decision State.
8. Test case
To test the capabilities of NavDIRecT during development, a sce-
nario was developed using a simple, generic structure consisting of
two rooms connected by a corridor, with a small population of agents.
In this test case, an agent, identified as ‘Warden’ in the mEX view
of Fig. 5, is tasked to walk through the
structure, systematically visiting each compartment and manually
searching for the presence of fire. If no fire is detected, the Warden will
move to the next compartment and repeat the search process. On de-
tecting a fire, the Warden is tasked with closing the door to the fire
compartment and warning other occupants about the fire thus instigat-
ing their evacuation. The Warden is provided with an itinerary to fol-
low a set path walking through the structure, visiting each compartment
and searching for fires (see the mEX view of Fig. 5, labelled “Warden's
search path”). Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 present screen captures of the coupled
mEX-SMF simulation (FSEG, 2018a). The mEX simulation is the pri-
mary window in Figs. 6 and 7, with the SMF simulation window shown
behind and below the mEX simulation window. Actions occurring in the
mEX simulation that affect the fire are reflected in the SMF simulation.
In the mEX window of Fig. 6, the warden is standing outside the closed
door, and the fire is burning in the cabin to the right (shown in the SMF
simulation window). In
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Fig. 6. SMF and mEX coupling, showing the spread of fire while the door to corridor is closed.
Fig. 7. SMF and mEX coupling showing the fire flow (in SMF) when the door is opened due to movement of personnel (in mEX).
Fig. 7, the Warden, following the search path presented in Fig. 5, en-
tered the cabin on the right then exited with the person positioned in
the cabin. They leave open the door linking the cabin and the corri-
dor. The open passageway creates airflow that affects the fire, as in-
dicated by the vectors. The simulation concludes when all occupants
have evacuated the structure. Since the mEX and SMF simulations are
coupled, any doors that the Warden opens or closes will be communi-
cated to the CFD Engine and reflected in the simulation. This means
opening the fire compartment door will result in the spill of hot fire
gases and smoke into the common corridor, whilst closing a door will
cut off any further spread through that door. The test case simulation
demonstrates the coupling of SMF and mEX (including actions of open-
ing/closing a door, which changes ventilation flow to the fire, while also
allowing the escape of fire effluents into the corridor), and that action-
able behaviour in the presence of an event is performed appropriately
(Woolley et al., 2016). The next stage of development is to demon-
strate the same coupling, and more advanced behaviours, within a sim-
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9. Use case
The initial use case scenario for NavDIRecT will utilise the ex-HMAS
Derwent geometry, a three-dimensional render of which is shown in Fig.
8. The ex-HMAS Derwent was a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) River Class
Destroyer Escort (modified from the Royal Navy Type 12M Rothesay
Class frigate) and decommissioned in 1994. During 1994, ex-HMAS Der-
went was utilised in the SSEP and subjected to a series of live fire and
explosion trials (Howe, 1996), and one of those trials will be utilised to
define and validate the use case.
9.1. Fire modelling
Fig. 9 presents the setup details for a fire scenario in ex-HMAS
Derwent. In Fig. 9 the initial location for the fire scenario is shown,
with the fire commencing in the forward crew quarters on Deck 3. Fig.
9 is orientated such that, ex-HMAS Derwent's stern is towards the up-
per portion of the image, bow is the lower portion of the image, port
is to the right and starboard to the left. In this scenario, as with the
live fire trial, the ventilation conditions were: a) a hole in the star-
board hull of the Deck 3 representing damage from the incoming or-
dinance; b) an opening (to air) in the port hull of Deck 3 represent-
ing the ordinance blast damage that initiated the fire; and c) an open
hatch leading up to the corridor of Deck 2. Though shown in the open
position in Fig. 9, cabin doors were closed during the fire simulation.
The exceptions were the doors at either end of the corridor on Deck
2, which, for simulation purposes, were open to outside air. The fire
scenario had multiple distributed fuel packages within the crew quar-
ters, including triple bunk mattresses. The fuel packages in the simu
lation were equivalent to the burnable items identified during a fuel sur-
vey performed prior to the SSEP fire trial, and identified in photographs
showing the interior of the crew quarters of the ex-HMAS Derwent also
prior to the SSEP fire trial. Fuel mass loss rates for the mattress were
determined by calorimeter experiment for the free burning of a single
small polyurethane foam mattress (adapted from (Vulcan Initiative,
2018)). This fuel arrangement is depicted Fig. 10 and the fuel mass loss
rate curve for the mattress is shown in Fig. 11. The total amount of fuel
released is equivalent to (approximately) 34 MW.
Fig. 12 presents the initial fire simulation test results (in plan view,
and as cut planes of temperature at 200 s after the fire started), where
heat transfer through the open hatch to Deck 2 can be seen immediately
aft of the circular main gun bay. Fig. 12 shows the simulated results
at 200 s into the fire, both as horizontal cut planes of temperature at
head height on each deck and as vertical cut planes through the hatch
between the two decks. The labels V1, V2 and V3 represent temperature
measurement locations (shown in Fig. 13, described later in this para-
graph). The open hatch located in the deckhead (that is, the ceiling) of
Deck 3 (also being the deck (that is, the floor) of Deck 2) is, essentially,
an open horizontal vent of given dimensions in the deckhead of the fire
compartment. In this scenario, the temperature curves (0C) measured
at the open hatch to Deck 2 (located 0m above the deck) and at three
points along the starboard hull where the missile entered the ship on
Deck 3 are presented in the graph of Fig. 13. The three starboard points
Starboard Forward Vents, Starboard Middle Vent and Starboard Aft Vent
correspond, respectively, to V1, V2 and V3 labelled in Fig. 12. The
graph indicates an initial spike in temperature soon after the multiple
fires are initiated. At first, the hatch (acting as an open deckhead vent)
has an almost identical rate of temperature rise to the other damage
openings, but it appears that the rapid and (initially) increasing release
Fig. 8. Three-dimensional render of ex-HMAS Derwent.
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Fig. 10. Distribution of fuel packages in the forward crew quarters (triple bunk mattresses
and drawer units). The starboard hull has the window-like openings (representing the mis-
sile entry point) in the upper diagonal left; forward is the lower diagonal left.
of heat from all the beds and furniture means that the dimensions of
the hatch are insufficient to allow all the hot gases to vent through
the hatch. Consequently, hot fire gases proceed to spill out of the
damaged areas of the hull,
mostly in the middle opening of the starboard hull. As the individual
fires pass their peak output, the rate of fuel release starts to decrease,
the hatch can, again, become a significant flow route. This results in an-
other brief temperature spike at the hatchway. After the second spike
the fuel sources are mostly consumed and the temperature through the
hatch and damage openings progressively decreases. To conclusively un-
derstand the fire behaviour in this scenario, further analysis is required.
This will be a topic of future research. For this scenario, the initiat-
ing blast was assumed to immediately ignite all of the distributed fuel
sources. This modelling approach may be unrepresentative of the initial
stages of the real fire as (a) the shockwave from blast may have relo-
cated fuel material and furniture in the compartment; and (b) partly/
fully protected fuel material may have resulted in a slower and progres-
sive fire spread from the initial fire location.
9.2. Crew movement
To demonstrate the ability of crew movement simulating naval DC
SOP procedures, a simple ‘blanket search’ scenario was devised and ap-
plied to the ex-HMAS Derwent model. For this scenario, the fire inci-
dent in the use case (Section 9.1) was assumed to have occurred and
the extent of damage yet to be established. The scenario involved the
formation of a search team, consisting of four crew agents, who moved
through the platform to search all compartments within a specified
area. The search path is presented in Fig. 14, showing a partial view
of the forward section of Deck 3. The search team arrived on Deck 3
via a ladder at ‘1’ and commenced their search moving to the com-
partment at ‘2’. Compartment ‘2’ is searched before the team moves
to search the compartment at ‘3’. From here they moved back to the
ladder at ‘1’ and continued the search on Deck 2. When the search
on Deck 2 was complete, the search team returned to Deck 3 via the
ladder at ‘4’ and continued immediately to Deck 4 via the ladder at
‘5’. Upon completion of the search on Deck 4, the team returned to
Deck 3 via the ladder at ‘5’. From here they moved in a clockwise di
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Fig. 12. SMF runtime visualisation showing simulated fire progression, at 200 s, through Decks 2 and 3 (top); and, intersecting, vertical cut planes of temperature (0C) showing heat
transfer between decks (bottom).
rection searching in sequence the compartments labelled ‘6’, ‘7’ and ‘8’.
After searching compartment ‘8’, the team returned to the ladder at ‘4’
and travelled up to Deck 2 where they continued the blanket search.
For this scenario, the crew agents were programmed with an itinerary
(that is, a route through the platform) they needed to follow. In this ex-
ample, the itinerary was calculated by mEX using simple heuristics that
identified the furthest compartment to be explored within the search
zone and then, in a clockwise direction, identifying the nearest compart-
ment to that location. The heuristics iteratively identified the compart-
ments to be explored from furthest to nearest, and then reversed the or-
der of compartments (from nearest to furthest) as the search route for
the crew to follow. Long term development of NavDIRecT will improve
the ‘intelligence’ of the heuristics by applying rules as defined by, say,
Behaviour Trees (Woolley and Liu, 2016) or other forms of cognitive
modelling (for example (Hollmann, 2015),). Eventually, control of the
crew agents will be managed by the Internal Decision and Action States;
thereby enabling the search team to make autonomous decisions regard-
ing their search pattern.
10. Discussion
The test case (Section 8) demonstrated the concept of integrating
SMF with mEX, showing the movement of people (opening and closing
doors) affecting the state of the fire and spread of fire effluents. The test
case, along with the ex-HMAS Derwent use case (Section 9) indicates that
modelling a fire scenario with the movement of crew in accordance with
SOPs, and in response to the fire, can be achieved.
The importance of this ability to model heat spread and crew move-
ment is reflected in the need to understand the possibility of sponta-
neous ‘cook-off’ of explosive ordnance (Gamble et al., 2014). Using
mEX, with scripted paths for crew movement, the time taken for crew to
respond to the fire can be predicted. During the time taken for the crew
to respond to the fire, concurrent modelling of fire spread can also be in-
corporated within the coupled simulation. This is an improvement over
a previous method (Gamble et al., 2014) using event trees and SME
opinion regarding the actions of the crew and the time taken to perform
those actions. Previous use of the event trees utilised subjective informa-
tion regarding the behaviour of crew, which resulted in subjective out-
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Fig. 13. Fire temperature (0C) curve as measured from the open hatch and at three locations on the starboard hull.
Fig. 14. Blanket search path.
sults, based on physics and mathematical understanding of the scenario,
giving realistic output in which analysts have a known level of confi-
dence based on the particular combination and fidelity of models used.
The M&S will also save time and resources when compared to develop-
ing the event trees. However, there are limitations with M&S such as
model fidelity (Section 4).
NavDIRecT modelling requirements were presented in Section 4,
with some of these requirements being demonstrated in the Test Case
(Section 8) and Use Case (Section 9). In particular, the requirement
for modelling movement through the platform is an inherent capa-
bility of the mEX pedestrian movement tool; and the requirement to
visualise simulations is inherent within mEX and SMF (for example,
Figs. 5–7 and 12). Two other modelling requirements have also been
demonstrated: crew behaviour; and temporal management. mEX, as de-
signed, is for the analysis of escape and evacuation from structures.
The Use Case (Section 9.2) demonstrated crew behaviour in the form
of a ‘blanket search’. During a blanket search, the crew perform a vi-
sual inspection to identify damage, the presence of fire, flood and/
or toxic hazards, and to locate incapacitated crew. Rules governing
more complex behaviours (for example, fire fighting) are currently be-
ing identified using HTA (Woolley
and Liu, 2016), with methods of implementation being performed un-
der another research program (Woolley and Liu, 2016).
The second modelling requirement being demonstrated is the tempo-
ral management between SMF and mEX, as shown in the Test Case (Sec-
tion 8). SMF is a CFD modelling tool, requiring time to perform a simula-
tion run (depending on the complexity of the scenario); conversely, mEX
can perform simulations in real time. Therefore, to enable the effects of
people movement (such as the opening and closing of doors, Figs. 5–7)
to be reflected in the fire modelling, temporal connectivity between the
two tools needed to be established. This is achieved by computing the
fire evolution for a time step within SMF, and communicating the fire
hazard data to mEX. Crew are then moved within mEX for the next time
step, with state changes (such as the opening or closing of a hatch) be-
ing communicated to SMF. The SMF model reflects those changes and
models fire progression for that time step. The process is repeated until
the conclusion of the simulation.
Other modelling requirements specified in Section 4 will be imple-
mented during the development of NavDIRecT. Current considerations
are being made for the database structure to store data from each of the
tools, and methods to communicate database changes to the simulation
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11. Emergent simulation capability
During the development of the NavDIRecT capability, it is expected
that new simulation capability may emerge – either by necessity, or as
a result of circumstance. One example that has thus far been realised is
new simulation capability developed in support of modelling the effects
of fire effluents on crew. Throughout the evolution of a fire, a number
of fire hazard effluents (such as, gaseous toxic species, oxygen deple-
tion and heat) are generated. For the crew, these fire hazards can result
in impaired vision movement, incapacitation or death. In the standard
method of communicating SMF data to mEX, the fire hazard data is av-
eraged over two vertical spatial zones. One spatial zone represents the
hazard level at a nominal ‘head height’, simulating the hazard to which
a standing member would be exposed. The second spatial zone repre-
sents the hazard level at a nominal ‘knee height’, simulating the hazard
to which a crawling crew member would be exposed. These two spa-
tial zones are depicted on the left in Fig. 15. During SMF – mEX inte-
gration for NavDIRecT, two new methods of fire effluent sharing were
developed. In the first, the zonal representation of the hazard data was
increased to have at least 10 continuous regions in height, instead of
just two disparate zones. This results in greater spatial accuracy for the
perception of fire hazards in the height direction. This multi-zone repre-
sentation of hazard data is also depicted in Fig. 15. The development of
this capability enables rendering of the fire and smoke simulation within
Unity for visualising the effects of smoke (such as, obscuration by soot
particles thereby reducing visibility) and temperature (for example, sim-
ulating the use of thermal imaging cameras).
Another emergent hazard modelling capability was a ‘Points-of-In-
terest’ (PoI) hazard formulation. This enables the local hazard environ-
ment to be focussed to a single point, such as in the vicinity around a
person's head in regions with high gradients of hazard properties (for ex-
ample, near strong ventilation flows, or nearing proximity to fires). The
PoI toxic hazard formulation can be used to model the effect of fire ef-
fluents on individual crew trying to evacuate a space affected by fire or,
in the longer-term, other toxic atmospheres – such as chemical warfare
agents. Consider, for example, the analysis of the fire on board HMAS
Westralia in 1998 (Kennett et al., 1998). The analysis showed carbon
monoxide concentration throughout the compartment; however, the fire
modelling capability at the time of the analysis could only be used to
estimate the effects on the crew. The new PoI hazard formulation can
now be utilised to model the toxicity concentration levels to which each
person would be exposed as they move through the platform. The new
PoI hazard formulation does not contain averaged hazard information
(as would have been previously the case in the standard method of com-
municating SMF fire data to mEX). Consequently, this emergent capa-
bility will enable analysis of the crew during fire-fighting and recover-
ability operations. Additionally, during crew training, the capability will
allow the platform crew to familiarise themselves with the perceivable
and non-perceivable effects of fire and to understand the toxicity of fire
effluents.
Fig. 15. New, enabling fire and fire effluents modelling capability.
12. Relevance to merchant and commercial shipping
NavDIRecT, while designed for the needs of naval recoverability,
also has application in merchant and commercial shipping. The NavDI-
RecT framework can easily be adapted to any maritime platform, and
a wide range of scenarios. It is only the underlying data and models
(such as models relating to SOPs) that are specific to naval, merchant
and commercial platforms. A comparison of the application of naval
survivability assessment for use in merchant and commercial shipping
in civilian and multi-mission scenarios examined the differences in re-
quirement between naval and merchant platforms (Papanikolaou and
Boulougouris, 2000; Nate and Goodfriend, 2015). Relevant to mer-
chant and commercial shipping are the requirements defined in the In-
ternational Convention for the ‘Safety of Life at Sea’ (SOLAS) (IMO,
2014). Therefore, analysis of merchant and commercial shipping only
requires relevant platform models to be developed, and an understand-
ing of crew SOPs to define the necessary crew movement and behav-
iour in mEX. The techniques being applied for the analysis of naval crew
behaviour (Liu and Woolley, 2015; Liu and Woolley, 2016) are also
applicable for analysing merchant crew behaviour, with the anticipated
method of implementation also being suitable for modelling merchant
and commercial crew. Subsequently, NavDIRecT will enable analysis and
validation of platform design in accordance with SOLAS (IMO, 2014).
13. Future work
The development of NavDIRecT, with the integration of SMF and
mEX, has the potential for being used in delivery of future recoverability
analysis capability, such as:
• fire suppression and/or extinction;
• boundary cooling to control the spread of the fire and heat to prevent
secondary events (such as explosive ordnance cook-off);
• multiple incidents and evolving incident analysis;
• blanket search for the discovery, and rescue, of injured crew, and
identification of fire and toxic hazards; and
• crew perception and reporting of the fire environment by identifying
smoke and heat.
To assist in delivery of the future capability, a number of key re-
search areas will be explored. This includes modelling realistic deci-
sion-making and response actions of the crew; visualising and com-
municating DC simulations and output; and verifying and validating
the NavDIRecT framework. Expanding NavDIRecT capability to analyse
other forms of damage incidents such as flooding using, for example,
FREDYN (Ypma and Turner, 2019), will also be examined.
13.1. Crew skill
During incident response, the effectiveness of crew performing re-
coverability SOPs is governed by their level of skill, knowledge and ex-
perience. Naval recoverability and DC training is an intense and ongo-
ing process. The training also includes focus on performing SOPs within
specific time frames. Exceed those time frames and the risk of mis-
sion failure, loss of life and loss of ship increases. There is also the
possibility of crew not performing, or incorrectly performing, specific
tasks dictated by the SOPs. This is likely to arise due to lack of ex-
perience, or might occur under the stress and fatigue created during
the incident response. Therefore, ability to model crew skill, propor-
tional to experience or fatigue, will be a future requirement. Further-
more, understanding how individual skills contribute to team behav-
iour and effectiveness will be necessary when modelling firefighting ac-
tivities and how those activities affect the fire. Modelling crew per-
forming SOPs using ‘behaviour trees’ is currently one option being ex-
plored (Woolley and Liu, 2016); however, at this stage, this solution
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is being performed. Ability to model crew ability to perform SOPs, such
as speed and efficiency will facilitate analysis of crew training, and of
the SOPs. When crew models are developed, changes to crew skill and
SOPs will be serviced by the NavDIRecT databases and plug-and-play
functionality.
13.2. Virtual Reality and Augmented Reality
The functionality provided by the game engine enables the use of VR
and AR technology. This will allow for ‘human-in-the-loop’ engagement
within DC simulations and allow users to affect the outcome of a sim-
ulation (Narayanan and Kidambi, 2011). Such a capability may be
utilised, for example, to enhance damage control training. In the VR and
AR environments, crew might interact with other crew undergoing train-
ing, and also with computer controlled agents, to familiarise themselves
with platform configuration; to simulate extreme scenarios that cannot
be achieved via other forms of training; and to explore the application
safety systems and SOPs. With the ongoing development of NavDIRecT,
the training and development capability, suitable for use within naval,
and merchant and commercial shipping environments, will progress as
emergent, enabling technology.
The use of VR and AR will also facilitate the communication of re-
sults to suit stake-holder decision-making processes. Utilising VR and
AR, the results from any analysis may be mapped to a real-world con-
text, giving clarity to the analysis process. This will also assist with com-
municating results to clients who may not have requisite expertise to in-
terpret the meaning conveyed by the analysis. VR and AR will, therefore,
enable stakeholders to view and optimise design changes, and make in-
formed decisions. Some of this capability has already been demonstrated
by the European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 project, AUGGMED (FSEG,
2018b), where the buildingEXODUS and SMF software were coupled to
the Unity simulation environment to develop a VR/AR training environ-
ment for first responders reacting to terrorist scenarios within crowded
environments.
13.3. Verification and validation of NavDIRecT
Some comparative studies of individual software tools (for example,
SMF and mEX) has occurred to determine the accuracy of the models
within the tools (Grech et al., 2012; Gamble et al., 2014); and val-
idation studies of meX and SMF have occurred (Galea et al., 2013,
2017). However, V&V of the integrated software environment will need
to be performed (whether for naval platforms or merchant shipping).
When complete, this will give confidence in the analysis, and an ability
to quantify the variance and estimated level of errors in the results.
14. Conclusion
The output from the current phase of NavDIRecT development has
successfully delivered a coupled fire and crew movement modelling ca-
pability. A proof of concept test case, integrating fire simulation and
crew movement behaviour, has also been demonstrated. Realistic fire
and crew behaviour has also been demonstrated, using mathematical
models to simulate interacting fire and crew behaviour. The integration
of SMF and mEX has enabled the development of a integrated framework
to analyse naval platform recoverability. When fully developed, NavDI-
RecT will be a significant improvement over other analysis techniques
that use static assessment of the probability of kill, or event trees with
subjective data.
The development approach, using a game engine at the core of the
simulation framework, provides numerous, significant benefits over ex-
isting implementations to model of Integrated Survivability. The game
engine allows for modular changes and scalability of the framework
as suitable (or more suitable) M&S capabilities become available, or
new threats and recoverability capabilities and procedures are devel-
oped. The game engine will also facilitate future ideas for VR and
AR scenarios and training utilising the NavDIRecT framework. This
will enhance damage control training, allowing crew to familiarise
themselves with platform configuration, and safety systems and proce-
dures. VR and AR will also enable platform design trade-off analysis.
The outcome from NavDIRecT development will facilitate assessment
of naval platforms to ensure they conform to survivability requirements.
NavDIRecT will enable platform design assessment during acquisition
and through-life upgrade, giving designers and mission planners the
ability to assure platform capability against specification requirements.
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